Tag: Salah

Cruyff: no striker in the box!

H all, a personal note before I start this JC article… I will be traveling in the coming month as one of my dear family members in Europe will need support :-(. I will be posting less regularly, but will do my best to keep the good stuff coming.

May I ask you to have a look at the donation options on the site? Traveling to Europe is pretty expensive these days ;-).

JC: “You can only rotate when one position is not taken. That position needs to be the central striker.”

It was the time of Denis Law, the agile Scot who scored 237 goals for Man United. The times of the golden left of Gigi Riva, scoring one goal per match for the Italians or Der Bomber, Gerd Muller, scoring 500 goals for Bayern Munich! It was the early 70s, a great time for goal scorers. Strikers who only needed one or two touches to tap a ball in. The Dutch had a number of them: Dick van Dijk, Ruud Geels, Willy van der Kuylen, Dick Nanninga…

There were three types of strikers: the mercurial fast ones (Rene van de Kerkhof), the player with the thunder in the thighs (Willy van der Kuylen) and the tall lighthouse target man (Dick Nanninga). Ideally, you had one striker who had this all (Haaland).

And, a striker was always your most advanced man and he was judged on goals.

Cruyff came onto the field as a strange #9. He was never in the point. And he still scored goal after goal after goal. Between 1966 and 1972 he would never score less than 33 goals per season. But the real impact of JC was not as a goal getter of course. His biggest impact was the fact that as a #9, he was hardly ever to be found in that most advanced position.

Johan Cruyff led the line in a way that other players could flourish in the areas vacated by him. The two-footed dribble king was to be found everywhere else. As the playmaker, or as libero, or coming from the left. He called himself, the “playing central striker”. Cruyff’s ability to be that wandering striker made him crucial for the execution of Oranje’s Total Football. Oranje would play people off the pitch with any player able to play on any position. Right wingers became strikers, right full backs ended up as left winger and the central striker became the deep lying playmaker. It was all being done.

Finding the space was sacred. No one was playing on the position as laid out on the line up board in the dressing room! Cruyff would start in the #9 role but would immediately drift away. He went wherever he felt like it. “A little wander here, a little movement there, playing along a bit and then explode into action.”

Watching Feyenoord, Ajax and Oranje play in the early 70s is really fun. Opponents have no idea how to deal with it. Man markers would follow JC across the pitch and ended up leaving huge holes in their defence. Or they simply allowed JC the freedom of the pitch, which is never a good idea against someone with his dribbling skills.

Cruyff’s teams always dominated the ball. There were always ample players around the ball. Ajax and Oranje dominated in that middle zone, which is still sacred in football tactics. The maestro’s partnership with Rep, Rensenbrink and Neeskens in 1974 was phenomenal. These three could score at will helped by the open spaces left by Cruyff.

The legendary #14 explains it in 1977: “There are people who believe I should play in midfield. They don’t get it. The remarkable thing about our football is: everyone is on the move, always. And it starts with me. I start as a striker but leave that space, which starts the big rondo. The defenders of the opponent are now in trouble. Because we come at them from various angles. If they mark me, others will get more space. If they don’t mark me, well… bring it on. They end up always having one defender too few.”

The traditional #9 got replaced by the False 9. The traditional 9 was told: stay high up the pitch, hold on to the ball, go deep and mainly: score. The False 9 is a high playing playmaker, who is focused on the team rotation and performance.

When Cruyff quit his active career, it seemed the false 9 disappeared too. Strikers like Nanninga, of Kees Kist or Peter Houtman and later Wim Kieft brought Oranje back to the traditional 9. Only when Cruyff returned to Barcelona in 1988 was the False 9 back. The Dream Team.

In 1989, Michael Laudrup was seen as one of the most elegant players in football but it wouldn’t happen for him in Italy. He used to play left winger or #10. Stoichkov was Barca’s #9 but Cruyff put the explosive Romanian on the wing and placed Laudrup in the striker role.

Cruyff was obsessed with creating triangles, and we’re not talking about the musical version of it. With Ronald Koeman as libero, Guardiola as defensive mid, attacking midfielder Bakero and striker Laudrup he had a spine in his team which could pass themselves out of danger. Barca’s dream team resembles the Tiqui-Taca team of Guardiola decennia later.

It was Guardiola who used the best player ever ™ as the false striker in his team. The birth day of the Star of Superstar was May 9, 2009. In Pep’s first season, Barca was four points adrift from Real Madrid. On day 34, El Classico was on the program and the pressure on Guardiola was immense. Barca missed the title two seasons in a row now and the 2-2 at Valencia on the 33rd playing day added to the pressure. And so, Guardiola called Messi, the night before the game. Could Leo maybe drop in for a bit?

At 10.30 pm, the 21 year old Lionel Messi enters Pep’s office. Marti Perarnau, the author of “Pep Confidential” explains the situation as such: “The 21 year old enters and Pep shows him a video. He freezes the video and shows Messi the space on the pitch. He wants Messi to work in these spaces. He calls it “the Messi Zone”. And he tells Messi: “I want you to start from the wing, as per normal. But when I signal you, I want you to dart through the middle. And when Xavi or Iniesta have the ball, you go. Straight ahead, and you’ll be face to face with Casillas.”

Pep didn’t tell anyone about this. He only told his assistant Vilanova the day before the match. Xavi and Iniesta were told during the warming up. What followed was a master class of football, with a 2-6 win at the Bernabeu for Barca. Samuel Eto’o suddenly played on the right wing and Messi would drift in and out of the zone where the older and massive Madrid defence would be. Xavi would later comment: “Pep changed the whole plan. With Messi as false 9, with Henry and Eto’o in the half spaces, forcing the defenders to decide. Leo, Andres and I could dominate in this way. It was one of the best games in my career.”

Barca would win the the triple that year. In the CL finals v Man United, he used the same trick. Eto’o started centrally but after 10 minutes he switched with Messi, who would win the finals for Barca with a header!

For quite some time, the false 9 was ignored or even forgotten by the rest of the football world. Through the decennia we have seen amazing #9s, from Papin to Zlatan, from Van Nistelrooy to Benzema, from Lewandowski to Peter Crouch, from Raul to Shearer and from Berbatov to Henke Larsson… But in 2022, we do see shifts. The “playing central striker” would be a good moniker maybe? At Liverpool, their #9 ( Firmino) usually plays in service of the danger men on the wings (Salah and Mane). At Cheslea, Lukaku warms the bench often while wandering Havartz is often preferred. At City we see different false 9s all the time, from Phil Foden to Sterling to De Bruyne.

Cruyff was ahead of his time, as we all know. Every modern team these days, is looking for a type of Cruyff striker. A player who can let the team play better by being absent.

Danjuma: one of the big guns now

A question….

I just got sent an amazing e-book on Cruyff (his death was remembered) and these stories are very cool.

I can do two things: 1) put a JC article on the blog every now and then but focus on current affairs or 2) focus on the JC articles and let the current affairs take a step back.

Any suggestions?

After this post on Danjuma, I will cover the Cup Final between Ajax and PSV.

Last year in June, Arnaut Danjuma was the guest in a tv sports show. He made a strong impression: ambitious, self critical and… outspoken. He questioned the KNVB. Did they pay attention to him? At all? Was he being following, playing for Bournemouth? What was the reason he was ignored? Could the NT manager maybe tell him what he needed to improve in order to get the call up?

There was no end to his confidence.

And not everyone could handle this swagger. Why is he playing for Bournemouth, if he is that good? Surely, we can’t take clubs like Luton Town or Bristol City or Millwall seriously? Danjuma felt invisible to the world and realised he had to make a move.

He consciously decided to go for Villareal and Unai Emery. He needed a coach who would focus on the details. Who would work on improving players tactically. He needed a “small club” with big ambitions. He used the services of one of those sports  analytics companies and came out at the Yellow Submarine for his future. So he said no to several other courters ( EPL clubs, Ligue 1 clubs, Bundesliga, PSV Eindhoven) and went to Spain. Under the radar.

By now, he’s shone at Old Trafford against Man U, he was top in the Wanda Metropolitano (v Atletico),  in the Bernabeu and the Juve Stadium. He is now a recognised European top player. Julian Nagelsmann used Danjuma as an example to explain that Bayern would not just beat Villareal.

This new status is completely the result of …himself. He took his career in his own hands (with his dad) and decided to invest in his development. He could have made way more money elsewhere. He now has a team that makes him better and he is in a team that he makes better as well. With a coach that will invest in him. Danjuma purs whenever Emery goes into detail tactically for the European opponents. After the 1-0 win over Bayern, Arnaut again explained the importance of Emery’s input.

He is the prime example of a smart player who keeps his eyes open and who invests in himself. Being able to be good with the ball doesn’t make you a good football player. At Villareal, Danjuma learns to understand and read the game and to think positionally. What do you do without the ball (which is 95% of the game for most). Arriving in the box in time, for instance. This is not talent, or touch or physical condition. This is about awareness, intelligence and “feel”.

In the run up to the Bayern clash, he said in an interview that he considers himself one of the best wingers in Europe. A big statement and without the context, a bit bigheaded? But he said more, way more, but the media ignored those other comments. For some, it’s a big much: he played Championship football until last year, he does not have a starting spot in the NT, he scored one Eredivisie goal in his career and never won a big trophy as a player.

Lets look at the wingers/forwards inthe TOp 5 competitions (EPL, La Liga, Bundesliga, Seria A, Ligue 1) and see which were involved in goals.

We won’t consider free kicks or penalty kicksl to make the comparison fair. Only goals from open play, in other words. Only 15 wingers were involved with 4 attemptos on goal or more, in 90 minutes of football.

The first column is the name of the player (duh!), the column “schoten” = “shots on goal” and the “Kansen gecreeerd” is “chances created”. Totaal is… well… I think you can find out for yourself :-).

The list will not surprise many people. You’d say “Salah, Sane, Messi, Gnabry, Insigne, Saka, Vinicius, Grealish, Mane” without hesitation. The PSG lads won’t surprise either. The two surprises are at the bottom of the list, with 4 “involvements” per match. Sheraldo Becker (yes!) at Union Berlin has been a surprise package in the Bundesliga and of course Arnaut Danjuma Groeneveld.

The only criticism: he does play as a central striker now as well in Emery’s fluid set ups. This is in fact in reality less the case. Like Memphis, Danjuma will prefer to come from the left with Moreno – a real striker – next to him. When Villareal has the ball, Danjuma plays more than a winger than someone like Salah.

He may be able to create more for others, but in terms of scoring, no one needs to doubt him. Only Benzema and new comer Aubameyang collect better stats.

This is not a player who is “hot” for a bit, this is a player who keeps on improving and has his eyes firmly on the statistics. It means that he’ll probably be scoring more goals next season.

There is one aspect in which Danjuma indeed is top class. He makes it into the top 5 of Europe: shots on goal after a successful dribble. You’d expect Messi to be on the list of course, but this is the current top 5.

Danjuma proves week in week out that in terms of positioning without the ball as in terms of individual dribbles and creating chances, he indeed is now amongst attacking royalty in Europe.

Would you use Danjuma as a starter?

Tell me your favority top 3 in LvG’s 3-4-1-2 system.

Mine?

Note: I do rate Gakpo and Lang as potential #10s and I have hope Schreuder will get Ihattaren back to full fitness.

 

 

Why Virgil and Gini will win the CL!

Finally, an English team will break the reign of the Spanish CL rulers. It is possible to break the combination and possession play that dominated European football for so long. In the 2005/06 season, the CL became a chess game on grass. In the four semi final matches, only 2 goals were scored. The average that season, was 2,3 goals per game which is the lowest since 1992/393.  The success of the Italian clubs and conservative coaches like Benitez and Mourinho led a new trend. The best way to win something in Europe, was the thought, is to build a strong defensive organisational unit and hope for a counter attack.

Twelve years later and offensive football is victorious. A trend that started with Barcelona. Between 2006 and 2015 they win the most important prize in club football four times! And with dazzling attacking play. And now, this style is being followed, obviously by Pep Guardiola himself, as he brings Bayern Munich and now Man City to the level of his Barca teams. When Barca wins the trophy in 2011, they are one of the few teams to pass 500+ times per match. In this season’s CL tournament, there are 10 clubs that manage this.

To stop the Barcelonas and Bayern Munichs of dominating, the “park the bus” tactics were used, and with success too! Mourinho with Inter Milan, Chelsea under Di Matteo. Atletico’s Diego Simeone turns it into an art form, by playing a solid 4-4-2  with very tight space between the players in a zonal defensive system.

But it’s a German coach who plants the seed in 2013 as a response to the Spanish combinationdomination. And that seed will result and has already resulted in the spectacle in the Champions League we saw this season…

It’s Borussia Dortmund vs Bayern Munich. Both teams have a football approach that starts with possession of the opponent, but with a thrust of pressure forward. A way of thinking reminiscent of the famous AC Milan team of the late 80s, early 90s under Arrigo Sacchi. Dortmund coach Jurgen Klopp: “My teams are modelled on the AC Milan team of Sacchi. He was my mentor. I actually never met him but my former assistant coach Wolfgang Frank, who did work with him.”


Exactly like Milan, Klopp’s teams are trained to re-possess the ball in areas and in moments where losing the ball will bring the opponent immediately into trouble. The opponent is unorganised and Klopp’s team will pounce. In 2013, Dortmund beats Malaga and Real Madrid, while Bayern humiliates Barca by winning 7-0 on aggregate!

It doesn’t result in a new German era of success, but it does bring about the new trend of zonal marking, aggressive forward pressure and immediate pressing when the ball is lost. This is how AS Monaco beats Man City in the CL season last year. And this is how PSG beat Barca 4-0 at home. Sadly, the Parisians lose their cool in the Camp Nou and resort back to their defensive, park-the-bus tactics and actually lose on aggregate…

The UEFA’s annual technical report is quite clear, in the 2016/17 season. More than 20% of all goals are scored from a fast transition in open play from defence to attack. And this is even without all the free kicks and penalty kicks that derive from this. The number of passes to create a goal is decreasing as well. As is the average time it takes to win the ball back and score. And almost half of the goals are the result of possession turnaround high on the pitch, in the final third.

That season, Liverpool isn’t in the CL otherwise the stats would have been even more prolific. In the EPL, Klopp is still faced with teams that are happy to use the long ball and by pass the whole build up. And in the EPL, Liverpool does lose too many points against those opponents. In the CL however, teams like to build up, to pass the ball, have possession and break down an opponent.  In the CL, it helps if you can play out from the back with incisive and risky passing, and it helps if you can re-possess the ball swiftly and set up a lethal attack at the same time. Liverpool can do both.

This Liverpool is not the best organised lot. Bayern Munich, Real Madrid, Juventus, Man City and Tottenham come to mind as being much better. But Liverpool is the King of Chaos. With the Reds, it is all about the turn around. When the opponent is just off the pace for seconds. When half the team of the opponent is still in forward motion and the other half breaks down to move back. Whenever Liverpool have the ball, they are prepared for when they lose the ball. When Liverpool are without the ball, they are preparing for the counter attack that will come, when they re-claim the ball. And, when Liverpool does start their turn-around move, they’re sheer unstoppable.

Ready for the press!

Klopp summarized it once as such, when asked what the difference was between Arsene Wenger’s Arsenal and his Liverpool. “Wenger loves to have the ball and loves to play from foot to foot. They’re well structured and balanced. Like an orchestra. They play lovely harmonies. I prefer heavy metal. I like noise. I like chaos.”

The Liverpool Stats on their way to the CL finals are stunning. Out of the 33 goals they scored, 28 goals were set up with less than four passes. No other team has scored or shot on target as often from the turnaround as Liverpool have…

Klopp organises his teams in such a way that winning the ball back equates becoming a threat immediately. This is how it’s done. The Liverpool team will veer with the opponents movement. The pace goes down a bit, every player protecting his zone. The team on the ball will actually believe they get a moment to breath and build up nicely. But Liverpool players are taught to recognise when the opponent gets into trouble. For instance, a pass on a midfielder with his face towards his own goal. Or a square pass to a back who is with his back to the line and has less options. Or a pass lacking the pace. A stray pass. Anything. And when that happens, it’s like Liverpool turns from kittens into leopards. They suddenly increase the intensity and hunt for the ball. Klopp’s team is like a predator, allowing the pray to think they’re safe. Until they’re not anymore.

The moment Nangolain made the wrong pass…

With Mane and Salah up top, Liverpool has the speed. And they work well together with false #9 Firminho, the first station in the counter attack, he will find the pass towards the two speedy forwards. Firminho is also the man to join in and his bursts usually create space for the upcoming midfielders, like Can or Wijnaldum or Oxlade Chamberlain. The Liverpool midfielders are all built for this chaotic style of play. They can all come up with creative solutions under pressure. Klopp: “How I coach the counters? That is not hard. I start with signing players who are willing to work hard every match and who are happy to run constantly, even if they won’t get the ball.”

And Liverpool is away….

And the entertainment value of Liverpool matches is the result of all this, as Liverpool also makes mistakes in their execution. They score 5 against Roma, using their strengths and concede 2 against Roma in situations where the cohesion is gone. When the field becomes too stretched or when a defender misses the challenge, Liverpool can become really open and vulnerable. Klopp doesn’t seem to care. “As long as we score more on the other end…”

These are the 6 principles of Jurgen Klopp’s philosophy:

  1. Lure the Opponent in

Liverpool doesn’t need the ball. Liverpool wants to control space. They determine where the opponent can go and where they can’t. By pressing early and high, opponents can either play the long ball, and there is a fair chance The Reds will win that (Virgil van Dijk) or they play out of the back, which is a high risk game. Because if they lose the leather, the likes of Salah, Mane and Firminho will tear you apart. Liverpool will drop back a bit, giving the opponent the idea it’s safe to start building up and then – as explained above – when a certain risky situation appears, they will pounce. They will all move towards the side where the ball is and suddenly block off the next pass.

2.  Direct the ball towards one side

Liverpool doesn’t mind it when the opponent has the ball as long as they have it where Liverpool wants them to have it. And they do this by not being totally in balance. It’s the smart body language and smart runs that will slowly force the opponent into a certain area. Roberto Firmino is the king of this game. He’s got the intelligence and the energy to repeatedly do this in a match. Klopp will find the weakest link in the opponents team and seemingly leave that player unmarked. Once he is played in (usually a full back) Firminho will move towards the player in such a way that the next pass is predictable. And pray for the next Liverpool player. Another element that is key is the ability of the Liverpool players to “mark” two players. Basically, the midfielders and the defenders of Liverpool are capable of putting pressure on the man with the ball but also by blocking a pass to a team mate of the opponent.

Liverpool forcing the goalie to make the risky pass into one of the central backs

3.  Prepare the trap

When Liverpool is at the point where the opponent is forced to the side where Liverpool wants them, the trap will be set. Liverpool will block every pass, except the one that Liverpool likes to see used. Liverpool keeps one option open and the player under pressure will usually use that option. In some situations, four Liverpool players will be ready to immediately put pressure on the ball with intensity and pace. Once the ball is won, Liverpool can immediately attack.

4. Set the trap

Liverpool, as a result of the number of players used in the trap, will always have players available to release the ball to. There is usually always a man more situation created as a result. Obviously, Liverpool will be understaffed on other areas of the pitch and sometimes a really special player will be able to play the ball in one time in that area, but Klopp is happy to have that risk. Because when Liverpool do win the ball, they have a man more situation (at least one man more) and most of Liverpool’s goals are scored from this situation.

5.   Do get the ball!

Apparently, this is the past where Klopp needed most work. Because putting pressure on the ball or actually getting the ball are different things. Klopp wants his players to go for the kill. Not complacent pseudo challenges. But go for the ball 100%. The result in the 2016/17 season: Liverpool players re-possessed the ball most out of all EPL players, and that includes creative players like Philippe Coutinho.

6.  Attack!

The last ingredient of the Klopp recipe is to actually attack. Don’t repossess the ball and recycle it with a square pass or a back pass. No. Attack! Immediately. The opponent usually is badly organised in these situations and Klopp wants to use that situation. But it does mean his players have to work ever so hard and cover so much ground. With Mane and Salah he has speed and with the likes of Firminho, Wijnaldum, Milner and Can he has the work horses to support.

With this style of play, it is easy to see why the top teams don’t like to play against Liverpool. But it also shows why it ‘s hard for Liverpool to win the EPL title. Most of the teams in the bottom half of the league will not try and dominate, or play possession and walk into the Liverpool trap. Against these teams, the long ball will be used by the opponent and Liverpool will have to find a Plan B to break these clubs down.

Winning the Champions League seems easier for Liverpool than winning the EPL title…

Thanks to VI Pro for the insights…